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Abstract 
 
For the past quarter of a century, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have 
grown exponentially across the world. Sub-Saharan Africa has, however, lagged 
behind and only lured on average a mere 2% of global FDI.  The investment that 
the region attracts tends, moreover, to be concentrated in a number of commodity-
rich countries. Natural resources and the size of national markets have generally 
been considered as the main drivers of FDI. The quality of local institutions has, 
by contrast, attracted less attention. This paper uses institutional data for 22 
countries in order to demonstrate that the quality of governance plays a far from 
negligible and enduring role in the distribution of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. It is 
shown that factors such as political stability, government effectiveness, lower 
corruption, voice and accountability, and the rule of law not only are more 
important determinants of FDI than the size of local markets, but also that their 
influence on the capacity of African countries to attract FDI is long-lasting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For the past quarter of a century, globalisation has unleashed an impressive 
growth in global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Designing, producing, 
managing, and selling in the four corners of the world has become the norm for an 
ever-growing number of companies. This phenomenon has certainly not remained 
without consequences. A company that relocates or invests in a foreign country 
brings with it physical capital, know-how, jobs, and other positive externalities, 
such as the promotion of exports and of domestic investment, making FDI very 
attractive for host countries. At the same time, it is often the case that competition 
ensues among countries and regions in order to ensure the attraction of FDI. And 
some countries and regions are simply more competitive than others. 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has, however, been somewhat cut off from global 
FDI flows. Even though the flows towards the region have significantly increased 
over the past twenty years, its share in global FDI remains very small. There are 
numerous reasons for this situation. The lack of adequate infrastructure in many 
parts of the Continent, the relative absence of macroeconomic and political 
stability, the weak level of human capital, and the frequent uncertainties affecting 
national legal frameworks represent only a part of the explanation. Some 
countries—Nigeria or Angola, to name two—are not doing too badly, essentially 
due to the presence of vast quantities of oil and/or mineral resources.  Given the 
relatively large size of its market, Nigeria and South Africa also feature among the 
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principal destinations for FDI in the region. For the great majority of countries, 
however, FDI stocks and flows remain tiny. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse to what extent other factors beyond the 
presence of natural resources and country size determine the amount of FDI there 
is channelled to a particular sub-Saharan African country. In particular, we are 
interested in what measure the quality of local institutions1 affects the attraction of 
FDI. We thus examine the evolution and distribution of FDI flows, on a global 
level, on the one hand, and within sub-Saharan Africa itself, on the other, before 
looking at the specific factors which may affect the attraction of FDI in the 
Continent. Section 4 proposes an empirical econometric model of the factors 
which influence the allocation of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa and explains the data 
used and their sources. Section 5 introduces the results of the analysis, putting 
special emphasis on the connection between governance variables and FDI – the 
main interest of the paper – and on whether this relationship determines long-term 
decisions on FDI. 
2. The distribution of foreign direct investment  
2.1. Global distribution2 
Global FDI has taken off since the mid-1980s. World annual FDI flows 
grew from a little over US$50 billion in 1983 to a peak of US$1,400 billion in 
                                                          
1 In this article, institutions refer to any public organization and entity, law and norm that influence 
the political, legal and economic environment in a particular country. Institutions are proxied by 
the quality of governance and are measured by means of six indicators developed by Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008). 
 
2 If not otherwise indicated, all data in this section are taken from UNCTAD. 
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2000. Global flows then decreased by 60% in three years, as the world economy 
at large experienced a slowdown. From 2004 to 2007, global FDI flows recovered 
and reached US$1,900 billion, before decreasing again due to the financial crisis 
in 2008. Global FDI flows went down to US$1,200 billion in 2009 before 
climbing back to US$1,760 billion in 2015.  
Developed countries were first to benefit from this surge in FDI. Emerging 
countries soon followed suit to the extent that, as in the case of trade (Ezcurra and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2014a), today around 50% of FDI is channelled to developing 
countries. During the 1990s FDI in emerging countries multiplied by a factor of 
seven, in line with the global trend. The sudden decline in FDI at the beginning of 
the 21st century was also felt by developing countries, though in much smaller 
measure. Between 2000 and 2003, the FDI going towards developing countries 
decreased by 30%, i.e. only half of the global average. Over the following four 
years, it resumed its previous rate of growth, almost reaching US$500 billion in 
2007 (27% of the global total). The 2008 financial crisis represented only a small 
hiccup for FDI flows towards developing countries. FDI in this part of the world 
recovered much quicker than in developed countries. After a decline of 20% from 
2008 to 2009, investment kept on increasing, reaching US$760 billion in 2015 
(43% of the global total). 
As illustrated by Figure 1, the developing world’s share of total global FDI is 
highly volatile, often contracting by half, sometimes even more, in the space of a 
couple of years (e.g. 1983-84 and 1997-2000). However, despite these sudden 
changes, the general trend in emerging countries has been towards a steady long-
term increase, from about 25% of the global total during the 1970s to around 40% 
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in recent years. This trend has been fundamentally shaped by the trajectories of a 
handful of countries, including, above all, China and India, but also other Asian 
countries, such as Singapore, or Mexico and Brazil in Latin America. In 2015, 
these five countries together attracted 44% of the FDI directed towards emerging 
countries, with China alone accounting for 18%. The remaining 56% are 
essentially divided between the Middle East, East and South-East Asia, and the 
rest of Latin America. 
Figure 1: Emerging countries’ share of global FDI inflows, 1980 – 2015. 
  Source: Own elaboration using UNCTAD data. 
2.2. The share of sub-Saharan Africa 
Africa, by contrast, has been somewhat isolated from these trends. Overall, the 
whole of Africa has done rather poorly. In North Africa FDI was mainly 
concentrated in Egypt, which in 2007 accounted for half of the FDI in the region. 
In sub-Saharan Africa the situation was even worse. Despite the fact that countries 
south of the Sahara have witnessed a net growth of FDI inflows since the early 
1990s, reaching US$42 billion in 2015 – an increase by a factor of 25 between 
1990 and 2015 – the starting point was very low. As can be seen in Figure 2, the 
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Continent’s share of global FDI remains marginal and has not surpassed the 4% 
mark in 35 years. Since 2003, it has hovered between 2 and 3% of global FDI and 
we have to go back to before the 1970s in order to find a time when the region 
accounted for more than 6% of global FDI flows. Sub-Saharan Africa has not only 
lost ground with respect to the developed world, but also compared to many other 
emerging economies. Even as the region saw a 218% increase in FDI during the 
1980s and 1990s, Latin America registered a growth of 560%, South Asia of 
789%, East Asia of 990%, and the developing countries as a whole of 760% over 
the same period (Asiedu, 2004). During the past 25 years, the region not once 
managed to attract more than 10% of the FDI directed to developing countries. 
Among the principal factors responsible for this gap are the low level of human 
capital, the economic instability and the lack of infrastructure, not to forget high 
tariff barriers (internal and external), the difficult and slow implementation of 
macroeconomic reforms, burdensome tax regimes, and the overregulation of 
markets feature prominently (Cotton and Ramachandran, 2001). The recent efforts 
by some countries in sub-Saharan Africa to put in place new policies to attract 
FDI have not always been successful and often the impact of these policies 
remains minimal when compared to other developing countries (Asiedu, 2004). 
The countries which have been more successful in turning around their FDI 
fortunes have been those, such as Mozambique, Tanzania, or Zambia, where 
modest privatisation policies and significant advantages in the rule of law and the 
protection of private property have been achieved (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002). 
As is the case with the developing world at large, the FDI directed towards sub-
Saharan Africa is concentrated in only a few countries. In 2015, the four principal 
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recipients of FDI – Angola (US$8,681 million), Mozambique (US$3,711 million), 
Ghana (US$3,192 million) and Nigeria (US$3,064 million) – alone attracted 43% 
of all FDI channelled to sub-Saharan Africa. In the same year, four countries 
together held 52% of the region’s total FDI stocks: South Africa (US$124,940 
million), Nigeria (US$89,735 million), Mozambique (US$28,768 million), and 
Ghana (US$26,397 million).   
Figure 2: FDI flows towards sub-Saharan Africa: total volume and share of global 
inflows, 1970 – 2015.  
 
Source: Own elaboration using UNCTAD data. 
3. What determines the attraction of FDI in sub-Saharan 
Africa? 
What factors explain the geographical concentration of FDI in certain countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa and not in others? The drivers of FDI, in general, and in 
emerging countries, in particular, have attracted considerable interest. Two have 
been the factors which have drawn the greatest attention as the determinants of 
FDI in sub-Saharan Africa: the presence of natural resources, on the one hand, 
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and the role of market size, on the other (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002; Asiedu, 
2006).  
On the presence of commodities, the concentration of FDI across sub-Saharan 
Africa basically mirrors – and especially in the case of the least developed 
countries – the distribution of commodities. The main common denominator of 
the four largest recipients of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa is the possession of large 
oil or mineral reserves. Oil and mining products make up, on average, more than 
80% of the exports of countries like Angola and Nigeria. In 2015, a group of six 
countries,3 whose exports were dominated by commodities, possessed more than 
30% of FDI stocks in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the other 70%, South Africa 
accounted for 24%, leaving less than half of FDI stocks for the remaining sub-
Saharan countries. 
Yet in the case of Nigeria and South Africa, to mention the two largest economies 
in the Continent, natural resources probably do not constitute the only or principal 
reason that would explain their privileged position in the FDI ranking. Although 
Nigeria is a large producer of oil and South Africa possesses large reserves of 
gold and platinum – these products making up more than a quarter of its exports 
in 2015 (WTO, 2017) – both countries also owe their share of FDI to the sheer 
size of their market, the other key determinant for FDI in sub-Saharan Africa 
according to the literature (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002; Asiedu, 2006). With a 
GDP of US$ 486 billion and US$314 billion respectively in 2015, Nigeria and 
South Africa squarely outrank the other economies in the region. Angola comes a 
very distant third (US$102 billion), followed by Sudan (US$97 billion). Taken 
                                                          
3 Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zambia (WTO, 2017). 
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together, these four countries represented 63% of sub-Saharan Africa’s 2015 
GDP, with Nigeria alone accounting for 30%. In that year, 44 countries shared the 
remaining 37%, of which only twenty had a GDP greater than US$10 billion 
(World Bank, 2017). 
The pre-eminence of natural resources and market size as the key drivers of FDI 
generates a number of problems. Firstly, the determination to a large extent of 
FDI flows by the quantity of natural resources a country possesses implies a much 
greater volatility in these flows (Ndikumana and Verick, 2008). Price fluctuations 
for these products mean that the interest of foreign investors in these countries 
will vary. The commodities boom from the early 2000s to 2014 led to a much 
greater interest among foreign firms, but the recent oil and gas price drop has 
generated uncertainty and volatility in FDI flows. Secondly, some of the positive 
externalities associated with FDI seem to be moderated when FDI is primarily 
devoted to natural resources. In terms of employment, for example, the impact of 
FDI is limited, given the predominance of physical capital in this sector. In a 2007 
report on FDI in natural resources, UNCTAD noted the lack of benefits from FDI 
for the economies of recipient countries, and stressed the necessity to establish 
clearly defined development strategies, so that these countries can turn their 
abundance of natural resources into sustainable development and profit 
(UNCTAD, 2007). UNCTAD further recommended the encouragement of 
industrialisation and diversification, using resource extraction as a catalyst for the 
creation of new sectors adding value to resources before they are exported, as well 
as for the promotion of industries capable of responding to the demand for goods 
and/or services on the part of foreign firms active in the region. Thirdly, if natural 
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resources and market size are really crucial for the attraction of FDI, many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa possess neither large reserves of oil and minerals, 
nor a large market.  
Natural resources and local markets are, however, not the only factors which 
attract FDI. A number of studies have examined the role of other factors on flows 
of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002; Basu and Srinivasan, 
2002; Asiedu, 2006). Colonial links, different privatisation policies undertaken by 
African states, and macroeconomic and political stability are considered to play a 
non-negligible role. Basu and Srinivasan (2002) identify the capacity of 
governments to implement structural reforms as a fundamental element for the 
attraction of FDI. The presence of sound monetary and fiscal policies, adequate 
exchange rate policies, and support for the development of the private sector send 
strong positive signals to investors. In addition, openness to international trade, 
the level of human capital, macroeconomic and political stability, corruption (or 
lack of it), and the quality of infrastructure have, among others, been mentioned as 
other potential factors driving FDI (Bende-Nabende, 2002; Asiedu, 2002 and 
2006). Yet few countries in sub-Saharan Africa can claim to be competitive in any 
of these areas in comparison to most emerging states in Asia or Latin America. 
The majority of countries in the region are laden with debt and frequent efforts to 
contain inflation have left, at best, mixed results. Participation rates in education 
have risen considerably in recent years (particularly at primary level) (World 
Bank, 2017), but the quality of  teaching as well the rate of students holding 
higher education degrees still remains low: participation in higher education in 
2005 hovered around 4% of the population in the relevant age group (Muco, 
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2008). Moreover, many investors point to the problem of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
‘bad reputation’ (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002). “Countries with better governments 
and governance attract greater FDI” (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2014b), 
whereas poor governance as well as a certain incapacity or low speed and 
effectiveness to implement new reforms have become important barriers for trade 
and FDI. What may amount to a lack of objectivity on the part of foreign firms 
perhaps offers a plausible explanation for the weak correlation between the 
adoption of new policies designed to attract FDI and the actual flows entering 
sub-Saharan Africa (UNCTAD, 2000). 
3.1. The role of institutions  
In contrast to the importance attached to the above-mentioned factors, institutional 
factors have tended to be, if not completely ignored, somewhat overlooked by the 
scholarly literature on the topic. Factors such as political and economic stability 
have often been deemed to have a limited effect on FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially as many of the reforms are either too recent or have been regarded as 
not particularly credible by investors (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002). Some research 
claims that good institutions in Africa may have a negative influence on FDI 
inflows, arguing that more democratic environments hinder monopolistic or 
oligopolistic behaviour from large foreign investors, allow businesses to organize 
and protect themselves from foreign capital, and make it complicated for host 
governments to offer generous fiscal conditions (Li and Resnick, 2003). 
However, according to Asiedu (2006), the evidence is far too thin and institutions 
represent an important omission in our knowledge about what determines FDI in 
some of the poorest countries of the world. As she underlines, FDI in Africa is not 
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only determined by exogenous factors. The quality of institutions – proxied by the 
level of corruption and the rule of law – is a sufficiently important factor 
explaining why FDI prefers some countries in the region to others (Asiedu, 2006).  
Good institutions can trump the presence of relatively large markets or natural 
resources. A country with a low level of corruption and where the rule of law 
applies is more likely to see its FDI stock increase (Asiedu, 2006). But more than 
whether the quality of institutions makes a difference, the question is to what 
extent is the role of institutions important in comparison to that accorded to other 
factors such as natural resources or markets. Asiedu and Lien (2011) indicate that 
democracy and FDI are positively correlated in countries where natural resources 
account for a low share of total exports, while the correlation becomes negative 
for countries where exports are largely dominated by primary commodities. 
However, many questions remain. Does an improvement in institutions suffice to 
counterbalance the lack of natural resources and the small size of some African 
markets? Can small countries that only possess few natural resources hope to see 
their FDI stock grow in the same measure as natural resource rich countries, such 
as Nigeria or Equatorial Guinea? While the answers to these questions are 
certainly debatable — and this will form the subject of the econometric analysis 
of this paper — it is logical to assume that better institutions will positively affect 
the amount of FDI a country succeeds in attracting and that the effect of 
institutional quality on FDI flows will be long-lasting as institutional change 
generally happens at a slow pace (Putnam, 1994; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013) and 
certainly slower than changes in the price of natural resources or in the size of 
African economies. As has been underlined, an increase in FDI inflows would 
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ensure a greater diversification of investors who will be attracted by factors other 
than commodities, thereby partly solving the problem of the lack of benefits from 
FDI for the local economy. 
Overall, the existing literature on the determinants of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa 
has failed to reach a strong consensus about which are the essential determinants 
for inward investment – or, at least, on the dimension of the impact of individual 
variables. While some regard political and economic stability and trade openness 
as strong promoters of FDI – the key issue seems to be related not to these factors, 
but to their credibility – other authors, for example, see market size as being the 
most significant factor for FDI (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002; Asiedu, 2006). 
Others, in contrast, do not even mention it (Basu and Srinivasan, 2002). The same 
holds for human capital, to which Asiedu (2006) alone seems to attach any 
importance. Anyanwu and Yameogo (2015) demonstrated that domestic 
investments and the urbanization rate – the latter associated with the creation of 
urban clusters, transport corridors and the necessary infrastructure – tend to attract 
FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In any case, the most astonishing gap in the literature relates to institutions and 
good governance. Only Asiedu places institutional variables at the centre of her 
analysis, without sufficiently scrutinising them, as she contents herself with 
observing the influence of corruption levels and of the rule of law (Asiedu, 2006). 
This paper will aim to fill this gap by dividing the notion of good governance into 
six distinct variables, while controlling for a host of other factors identified in the 
literature as key promoters of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. It will also explore the 
time influence of country-level institutional quality. The slow pace of institutional 
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change may imply that institutional conditions can determine FDI inflows into 
specific countries and other economic outcomes for years and, in some cases, 
decades to come. 
4. Model and data 
4.1 Econometric analysis 
This section aims to provide an answer to the three main questions emerging from 
the discussion above. The first is what is the role of institutions – and in particular 
good governance – on the attraction of FDI towards countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Second, whether this role by institutions is more or less significant than 
that awarded to other key factors behind FDI, such as a country's endowment of 
natural resources and its market size. And, third, whether the effect of institutions 
on FDI flows persists in time. The model used in order to address these questions 
adopts the following form:  
ittititititi XMSizeNatresGovFDI eµφθλβa ++++++= ,,,,, 0          (1)  
where FDI depicts the foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP received 
by country i in any given year t; Gov represents a matrix of variables depicting the 
quality of governance; Natres is an indicator of natural resources, proxied by the 
percentage of oil and mining and exports; MSize represents an indicator of the 
potential market in any given country; and X is a vector of other variables which 
are assumed to influence the location of FDI. Finally, μ are unobservable time-
specific effects and ε depicts the residual factor.  
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4.2. Data  
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is represented by the FDI inflows as the percentage for 
GDP in every sub-Saharan African country for which complete sets of data are 
available. FDI inflows are preferred to stocks as they present a snapshot of the 
current situation without (or only marginally) taking into account the historical 
events that have influenced a country’s FDI stock. The GDP data are taken from 
the Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund. The data 
concerning FDI inflows are available from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. 
Explanatory variables  
• Good governance 
The explanatory variables of interest are linked to the notion of good governance. 
Good governance is measured by means of six indicators developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) at the World Bank, which are based on 
hundreds of individual variables contained in 35 databases that were compiled by 
32 different organisations (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2008). The six 
‘good governance’ variables include: voice and accountability; political stability 
and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; the rule of 
law; and control of corruption. These indicators aim to represent the perceptions 
of governance held by the public and private sectors, NGOs, businesses, and 
individual citizens. Information for the variables is gathered from organisations 
located in different regions of the world in order to minimise potential biases. The 
 17 
 
authors attribute each variable a value ranging from -2,5 (poor performance) to 
2,5 (excellent performance). Given that political instability, lack of government 
credibility and poor quality of institutions are often cited as factors that limit the 
amount of FDI directed towards sub-Saharan Africa, the expectation is, a priori, 
that a good performance in any of these domains would be related to higher levels 
of FDI.  
In particular, each of the six good governance indicators represents the following. 
Voice and accountability measures the perception of the capacity of the citizens of 
a given country to participate in the selection of its government, alongside the 
freedoms of expression, assembly, and the press. Political stability aims to assess 
the probability that a government would be destabilised or overthrown by violent 
or unconstitutional means, and also includes politically motivated violence and 
terrorism. Government effectiveness assesses the perception of the quality of 
public services and of the civil servants who deliver them, as well as their degree 
of independence from political pressure. It also takes into account the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, along with the credibility of a 
government’s policy commitments. Regulatory quality measures the perception of 
a government’s capacity to formulate and implement sound regulatory policies 
that facilitate and promote the development of the private sector. Rule of law 
gauges the confidence actors have in societal rules, as well as the respect accorded 
to them, with particular reference to the reliability of contracts, property rights, 
the police, and the courts. It equally considers the levels of crime and violence. 
Finally, control of corruption assesses the extent to which the public sector is used 
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for private ends, including both minor and major forms of corruption, and any 
‘appropriation’ of the state by elites and private interests in general.  
Because of the high correlation among some of the ‘good governance’ variables, 
we resort to principal component analysis (PCA) in order to create a number of 
composite variables capable of capturing different institutional and governance 
dimensions in sub-Saharan Africa. Three composite governance variables are 
created. These are government quality, citizens’ rights and political stability, and 
overall governance.   
Government quality combines the three variables, which according to their 
respective definitions best reflect the quality of government in a general sense. 
These are government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption. 
The outcomes of the PCA have the expected signs and are listed in Annex 1a. The 
first principal component, which we use as our government quality variable, 
accounts for 79% of the total variance.  
Citizens’ rights and political stability combines the remaining governance 
variables. The first principal component, used as the composite variable, explains 
almost 82% of the total variance (Annex 1b).  
Overall governance combines all six variables as a means to evaluate the 
importance of the quality of governance at large in the attraction of FDI. All the 
variables included in the composite governance index have the expected signs and 
the first principal component accounts for almost 75% of the total variance 
(Annex 1c).  
• Natural resources and market size  
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The relevance of the good governance variables for FDI is weighed against that of 
the two other fundamental factors for the attraction of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, 
according to the scholarly literature: natural resources and market size. 
Regarding natural resources, the African Continent probably possesses more 
natural wealth than any other region in the world and for many sub-Saharan 
African countries proceeds from natural resources are a substantial source of 
revenue. It is therefore essential to include a variable that permits the assessment 
of the actual influence of these resources on the distribution of FDI in sub-
Saharan Africa. We therefore look at oil and mining products as a share of any 
given country’s total exports. The relevant figures are taken from the statistical 
database the World Trade Organisation (WTO, 2017). A positive correlation 
between a country’s quantity of natural resources and the flows of FDI it attracts 
is to be expected.   
Market size has also been generally perceived as a key driver of FDI across the 
world, although, because of the presence of relatively small markets, its influence 
may not be quite as felt in many sub-Saharan African countries. We proxy the size 
of the market of a country by its overall GDP, measured at constant prices. The 
GDP data are the same as those used for the denominator of the dependent 
variable. We expect, as per the relevant literature, the relationship between market 
size and FDI to be positive. However, we use the natural logarithm of GDP as the 
positive effect of the market is likely to fizzle out beyond a certain threshold. 
 
• Other control variables 
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We also control for an additional number of factors which, according to the 
literature, may have some influence on the attraction of FDI. These include the 
wealth of the population proxied by GDP per capita at constant prices. As Asiedu 
(2002) points out, the views on the association between this variable and FDI are 
ambiguous. A higher level of wealth generally bodes well for investment, since a 
company would want to place its products on the local market upon establishing 
itself in a country. A lower level of wealth, on the other hand, could spark the 
interest of investors, as poorer countries may offer a greater potential return on 
capital. It is therefore difficult to anticipate ex ante what the sign of the coefficient 
will be. The figures for GDP per capita are extracted from the International 
Monetary Fund’s online database. Following the same logic as in the case of 
market size, GDP per capita is expressed as a logarithm.     
Macroeconomic stability is also used as another potential driver of FDI. We use 
the inflation rate as our proxy for macroeconomic stability. The source of data is, 
once more, the International Monetary Fund. High levels of inflation are a clear 
symptom of macroeconomic instability, leading to the expectation of a negative 
relationship between this variable and the dependent variable.    
The two final variables represent human capital and market openness. The 
endowment of human capital in any given country is likely to have a positive 
association with FDI; the better the endowment of human capital, the higher the 
level of FDI. However, this potential association is likely to be mediated by the 
type of investment coming into the country and it is therefore not always clear-cut 
that the association would always be positive. As educational data are frequently 
elusive, we resort to the enrolment rate in primary education as our measure of 
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human capital. The data are taken from the World Bank (WB, 2008). The final 
variable is market openness. It is expected that open markets would facilitate trade 
with the rest of the world and particularly favour investors seeking to export their 
products. Market openness is measured by the total of a country’s imports and 
exports as a share of GDP. The relevant figures come from the online database of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO, 2009).  The sign of the coefficient is 
expected to be positive. 
The key variables and their sources are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of the variables used in the econometric analysis 
Variable Measure Source Expected sign 
Dependent variable 
FDI flows FDI inflows in % of GDP UNCTAD and IMF / 
Good governance variables 
Voice and 
accountability 
Value between  
-2,5 and 2,5 
World Governance 
Indicators 
(World Bank) 
+ 
Political stability 
Government 
effectiveness  
Regulatory quality 
Rule of law 
Control of 
corruption 
Natural resources and market size 
Natural resources 
% of oil and 
mining products 
in exports 
WTO + 
Market size Log GDP 
IMF 
+ 
Other control variables  
Wealth of the 
population 
Log GDP per 
capita ? 
Macroeconomic 
stability Inflation rate - 
Human capital Enrolment rate in primary education  
World Development 
Indicators 
(World Bank) 
+ 
Market openness Imports + exports in % of GDP WTO and IMF + 
 
5. Results of the analysis 
Model (1) is estimated by means of a balanced panel data analysis for the 22 sub-
Saharan African countries4 for which complete sets of data are available. Two 
                                                          
4 The countries considered in the analysis include Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Mauritius, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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periods considered. First, the analysis is conducted between 1996 and 2005, 
covering the period before the commodity-driven hike in FDI towards sub-
Saharan Africa. Second and in order to evaluate the medium- to long-term 
influence of country level conditions on FDI, the connection between specific 
country conditions during the period between 1996 and 2005 and FDI 10 years 
later – that is between 2006 and 2015 – is estimated. Following the results of the 
Hausman test, panel data estimations with random effects are preferred to the use 
of fixed effects. Four main tables are extracted from the analysis. In Table 2 the 
results of estimating model (1) are presented for every single individual ‘good 
governance’ variable. Table 3 introduces the three composite governance 
variables (government quality; citizens’ rights and political stability; and overall 
governance), while Table 4 inserts a dynamic element to the analysis, by looking 
at the evolution of the coefficients of the six governance variables over time. The 
same analysis is conducted for up to 3 annual lags. For each regression a number 
of normality, specification error, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation tests are 
conducted. Finally, Table 5 looks at the medium- to long-term impact of FDI, by 
connecting country specific conditions between 1996 and 2005 with FDI flows 
between 2006 and 2015. 
Regressions (1) through (6) in Table 2 assess the connection between each of the 
individual ‘good governance’ variables (voice and accountability; political 
stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; the rule of law; and control 
of corruption) and foreign investment in sub-Saharan Africa, while controlling for 
natural resources, market size, and the other independent variables. In regression 
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(7) all the governance variables are included together simultaneously, although 
the significance of this latter regression is seriously undermined by problems of 
multicollinearity, derived from the high level of correlation between the 
individual governance variables.  
The results of the analysis highlight that the quality of governance of different 
sub-Saharan nations makes an important difference for FDI (Table 2). Five out of 
the six good governance variables considered display significant coefficients. 
Countries that are politically more stable, which have more effective 
governments, where the rule of law prevails, and which tend to control corruption, 
once other factors are controlled for, attract FDI to a much greater extent than 
countries that do not. The only exceptions are regulatory quality, which seems to 
be completely dissociated from FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, and voice and 
accountability, which has a negative association with FDI.  
On top of quality of governance a number of other control variables display a 
strong connection with FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. This is particularly the case, as 
was expected by theory, of the presence of natural resources. The coefficient for 
our natural resources proxy is always a positive and significant, indicating that 
African nations with a good endowment of oil and minerals are magnets for FDI. 
The other factor highlighted by the literature as a key determinant of FDI, market 
size, displays by contrast a non-significant coefficient in all regressions. Once 
other factors are controlled for, it does not seem that foreign investors are 
attracted by the dimension of the market of African countries. Similarly, market 
openness is also totally dissociated from FDI. A further sign that markets may not 
seem to matter for FDI in sub-Saharan Africa is the negative and insignificant 
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coefficient of the wealth of the population in all regressions. Richer countries not 
only do not attract greater FDI, but, once other factors are controlled for, seem to 
be pushing FDI away. Finally, human capital is positively connected to FDI, 
while macroeconomic instability, proxied in our analysis by the inflation rate of 
every country, displays the expected negative and significant sign. 
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Table 2. Estimation of the model (1) with individual good governance variables. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a % of GDP 
Natural 
resources 
0.026*** 
(0.0079) 
0.027*** 
(0.0078) 
0.031*** 
(0.0078) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.0079) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.0075) 
Market size 
 
-0.0003 
(0.893) 
0.472 
(0.908) 
-0.431 
(0.868) 
-0.045 
(0.89) 
0.127 
(0.876) 
-0.232 
(0.868) 
0.065 
(0.753) 
Wealth level of 
the population 
-3.083*** 
(1.036) 
-3.386*** 
(1.029) 
-3.425*** 
(1.005) 
-3.38*** 
(1.041) 
-3.238*** 
(1.008) 
-3.392*** 
(1.01) 
-3.095*** 
(0.791) 
Inflation rate 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Human capital 
 
0.038** 
(0.018) 
0.03* 
(0.018) 
0.029* 
(0.017) 
0.034* 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
0.033* 
(0.017) 
0.02 
(0.015) 
Market 
openness 
-0.374 
(1.33) 
-0.67 
(1.313) 
-0.767 
(1.307) 
-0.303 
(1.342) 
-1.302 
(1.358) 
-1.132 
(1.333) 
-1.044 
(1.278) 
Voice and 
accountability 
-0.663* 
(0.369) 
     -1.811*** 
(0.401) 
Political 
stability 
 0.879*** 
(0.313) 
    0.66* 
(0.356) 
Government  
effectiveness 
  1.459*** 
(0.467) 
   1.768*** 
(0.607) 
Regulatory 
quality 
   0.447 
(0.347) 
  0.171 
(0.376) 
Rule of law     1.304** 
(0.526) 
 0.071 
(0.66) 
Control of 
corruption 
     1.161*** 
(0.419) 
0.659 
(0.526) 
Constant 
 
7.780** 
(3.725) 
8.181** 
(3.643) 
12.066*** 
(3.664) 
9.482*** 
(3.646) 
10.001*** 
(3.576) 
10.965*** 
(3.619) 
9.96*** 
(3.078) 
Time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R² within 0.2050 0.2334 0.2230 0.1969 0.2058 0.2088 0.3089 
R² between 0.1062 0.0727 0.1269 0.0821 0.1305 0.1295 0.2578 
R² overall 0.1122 0.0903 0.1404 0.0929 0.1379 0.1419 0.2716 
Normality of 
Residuals 
(prob>chi2) 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
Ramsey – Reset 
(prob>chi2) 0.0459 0.3885 0.3978 0.2454 0.0205 0.0451 0.0000 
Heteroscedastic
ity (prob>chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Autocorrelation 
(prob>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Standard error is in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
 
In Table 3 we introduce the three composite governance variables 
calculated by means of principal component analysis (PCA) in replacement of the 
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individual variables. The introduction of the composite governance variables does 
not affect the sign and significance of the coefficients of the control variables.  
The combination of individual governance variables into composite variables does 
not alter the perception that governance matters for FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Government quality displays a clearly positive and significant coefficient, while 
the association between citizens’ rights and political stability and FDI is positive, 
but not significant. Finally, the combination of all six individual governance 
variables, overall governance, is strongly and positively connected with FDI. This 
indicates that countries with the best levels of governance in sub-Saharan Africa 
are also those more likely to attract FDI, once other factors such as the presence of 
natural resources, macroeconomic stability and human capital – which appear to 
be the other main drivers of FDI – are taken into account. 
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Table 3: Estimation of the model (1) with the composite good governance variables. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a % of GDP 
Natural resources 0.0299*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0287*** 
(0.008) 
0.0296*** 
(0.0079) 
Market size 
 
-0.147 
(0.88) 
0.033 
(0.897) 
0.008 
(0.888) 
Wealth level of the 
population 
 
-3.686*** 
(1.033) 
-3.294*** 
(1.035) 
-3.492*** 
(1.037) 
Inflation rate 
 
-0.0053 
(0.0035) 
-0.0078** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0061* 
(0.0036) 
Human capital 
 
0.0303* 
(0.017) 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.029* 
(0.018) 
Market openness -0.695 
(1.305) 
-0.737 
(1.345) 
-0.813 
(1.327) 
Government quality 
 
1.007*** 
(0.317) 
  
Citizens’rights and 
political stability 
 0.431 
(0.299) 
 
Overall Governance 
 
  0.574** 
(0.24) 
Constant 
 
11.684*** 
(3.704) 
9.509*** 
(3.657) 
10.578*** 
(3.689) 
Time controls YES YES YES 
R² within 0.2336 0.1954 0.2153 
R² between 0.0903 0.0903 0.0850 
R² overall 0.1102 0.1005 0.1002 
Normality of Residuals 
(prob>chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ramsey – Reset (prob>chi2) 0.2260 0.1764 0.2285 
Heteroscedasticity 
(prob>chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Autocorrelation (prob>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations 176 176 176 
Standard error is in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
 
In order to test whether the connection between good governance and FDI in sub-
Saharan Africa expands beyond the short-term, we introduce two different types 
of analyses: a) we consider a series of annual lags in model (1) (Table 4); and b) 
we analyse the connection between country-level conditions during the period 
1995-2006 and FDI 10 years later (2006-2015) (Table 5).  
Table 4 reports only the coefficients for the six governance variables without the 
controls. The introduction of time lags does not fundamentally alter the 
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coefficients of the control variables. Market size and market openness remain 
insignificant in all specifications of the model, whereas the positive and 
significant association between natural resources and FDI persists in time. The 
same could be said for the negative connection between wealth and inflation, on 
the one hand, and FDI, on the other. If anything, and as could be expected, the 
coefficients tend to become somewhat weaker over time. The only control 
variable which experiences a change in coefficient is human capital, which 
becomes insignificant once in the first time lag is introduced in the analysis. 
Regarding the governance variables, only rule of law and control of corruption 
show a consistent and enduring association with FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Countries that effectively apply the rule of law and have better systems for the 
control of corruption are capable of attracting a greater share of FDI relative to 
their GDP. Investors deem it to be unlikely that the legal framework of a country 
and its level of corruption can change radically in the relative short-term and 
hence, once a certain level has been reached in these two areas, investors may 
consider the risk that the country will regress to be generally relatively small. 
Government effectiveness displays a similar behaviour, although its significance 
tends to wane with time, as shown by the coefficient in the regression including 
three annual lags (Regression 4). Making a government more effective is a task 
that requires patience, which, in turn, renders it difficult for the newly acquired 
effectiveness to collapse in the short-term.  
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Table 4. Dynamic analysis. 
Variables 
 
(1) 
No lag 
(2) 
1 lag 
(3) 
2 lag 
(4) 
3 lag 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a % of GDP 
Voice and 
accountability 
 
R2 overall 
 
-0.663* 
(0.369) 
 
0.1122 
-0.483 
(0.396) 
 
0.1000 
-0.415 
(0.449) 
 
0.0898 
-0.458 
(0.511) 
 
0.0908 
Political stability 
 
 
R2 overall  
 
0.879*** 
(0.314) 
 
0.0903 
0.317 
(0.353) 
 
0.0840 
0.033 
(0.417) 
 
0.0764 
-0.356 
(0.482) 
 
0.0906 
Government 
effectiveness 
 
R2 overall  
 
1.459*** 
(0.467) 
 
0.1404 
1.582*** 
(0.503) 
 
0.1327 
1.068* 
(0.579) 
 
0.1106 
0.757 
(0.644) 
 
0.0900 
Regulatory quality 
 
R2 overall  
 
0.447 
(0.347) 
 
0.0929 
-0.276 
(0.361) 
 
0.1005 
-0.906** 
(0.397) 
 
0.1076 
-1.423*** 
(0.424) 
 
0.1255 
Rule of law 
 
 
R2 overall  
 
1.304** 
(0.526) 
 
0.1379 
2.047*** 
(0.567) 
 
0.1406 
1.931*** 
(0.641) 
 
0.1236 
1.976*** 
(0.697) 
 
0.0981 
Control of corruption 
 
R2 overall  
 
1.161*** 
(0.419) 
 
0.1419 
1.488*** 
(0.438) 
 
0.1369 
1.696*** 
(0.482) 
 
0.1146 
2.035*** 
(0.51) 
 
0.0795 
Number of 
observations 
176 154 132 110 
The standard error is in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
respectively.  
 
Finally, Table 5 reports the results of regressing the three key determinants of FDI 
– natural resources, market size, and institutional quality – between 1996 and 
2005 on FDI 10 years later, between 2006 and 2015. The results highlight that 
both natural resources and institutional quality trump market size as the 
fundamental determinants of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa over the medium- and 
long-term. The coefficients for natural resource endowment and the different 
institutional variables, by and large, remain positive and significant. By contrast, 
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that for market size, which was insignificant in Tables 2 and 3, becomes negative 
and significant at the 1% level. This implies that, once institutions and natural 
resources are accounted for, large countries in Africa attract less and not more 
FDI over the medium-term. Moreover, four of the six institutional quality 
variables – voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
and control of corruption – seem to exert a long-lasting influence on the amount 
of FDI that is directed to any particular sub-Saharan African country ten years 
later (Table 5). Hence, countries with poor governance quality can endure the 
consequences of their weak institutions over a considerable amount of time. 
Table 5. Institutional conditions (1996-2005) and FDI 10 years later (2006-2015). 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a % of GDP 
Natural 
resources 
0.0779*** 0.0644*** 0.0783*** 0.0644*** 0.0696*** 0.0737*** 
(1.499) (1.458) (1.601) (1.514) (1.592) (1.654) 
Market size 
 
-0.4599*** -0.2745*** -0.4710*** -0.3974*** -0.3788*** -0.4126*** 
(0.837) (0.909) (0.891) (0.848) (0.839) (0.853) 
Voice and 
accountability 
2.418***      
(0.628)      
Political 
stability 
 1.715***     
 (0.593)     
Government  
effectiveness 
  2.333***    
  (0.884)    
Regulatory 
quality 
   0.826   
   (0.760)   
Rule of law     1.164  
    (0.798)  
Control of 
corruption 
     1.544* 
     (0.906) 
Constant 19.34*** 12.30*** 19.80*** 16.31*** 15.90*** 17.11*** 
 (3.380) (3.460) (3.670) (3.417) (3.338) (3.451) 
Time 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
observations 
220 220 220 220 220 220 
Number of 
years 
10 10 10 10 10 10 
R2 overall 0.217 0.193 0.188 0.165 0.169 0.172 
Standard error is in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
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Overall, the results of the empirical analysis indicate that FDI in sub-Saharan 
Africa is mainly driven by two out of the three key factors identified by the 
literature. FDI flows towards countries with a good endowment of natural 
resources. Hence, countries with a good endowment of natural resources but 
relatively weak institutions, such as Nigeria, can still attract a considerable 
amount of FDI.  
But right next to natural resources is the prominent role played by governance and 
institutional aspects on the attraction of FDI. Our analysis underlines that the 
quality of governance of any given sub-Saharan African nation is definitely 
connected to the flows of FDI entering that country. In a general manner, this is 
demonstrated by the coefficient obtained for the overall governance variable, 
which, in addition to being positive, is significant at 5% level. These results 
regarding the importance of the quality of governance for FDI are reinforced by 
the strongly significant and positive coefficients for the composite variable 
government quality, as well as by those for the majority of the individual 
governance variables. More stable, effective, and less corrupt governments that 
uphold the rule of law act as magnets for FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. Investors 
have a tendency to shy away from unstable governments, as well as from those 
regarded as ineffective or where corruption is rife. A functioning legal system and 
a comparatively low level of crime drive inward investment. Property rights and 
the reliability of contracts are also crucial for any investor, making the rule of law 
key amongst the factors driving FDI. More importantly, good institutions have a 
long-lasting influence on the perception of investors, as the quality of governance 
in Africa at a given point still determines FDI ten years down the line. 
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By contrast, the third key determinant of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa – market size 
– does not make a difference for FDI and, if anything, it may be detrimental for 
foreign investment. This may be related to the fact that even the largest markets in 
the region are too small to influence investment decisions, and because many 
foreign firms export their products outside the countries where they invest in and 
out of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. If certain commodity-rich countries have a 
relatively large market compared to the rest of the region, such as Nigeria or 
South Africa, this is not necessarily the case for most other countries well-
endowed with natural resources. Hence a country like Gabon, where oil and 
mining products made up more than 80% of exports between 1996 and 2005 
(WTO, 2017), remains a tiny market5 and one with low prospects for significant 
expansion. Investors in sub-Saharan Africa are first and foremost concerned with 
the presence of natural resources and the institutional conditions which would 
guarantee their investment. Whether these countries have a relatively large 
internal market is of secondary interest and thus irrelevant in the context of our 
analysis.  
The coefficients for the remaining control variables suggest that investors are 
attracted to poor countries, reinforcing the idea that getting returns from relatively 
well-off local markets is not one of the main objectives. FDI also takes the level 
of human capital into consideration. Everything else being equal, foreign investors 
prefer countries with a relatively good level of education of the labour force to 
those where the levels of skills are lower. Macroeconomic stability is also a key 
determinant of FDI, confirming the results of the literature. Multinational 
                                                          
5 GDP of US$8,7 billion in current prices in 2008 (IMF, 2009).  
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companies and foreign investors will have an interest in avoiding unstable 
markets. Last but not least, the openness of a local market does not seem to 
influence the amount of FDI being channelled to specific sub-Saharan African 
countries. This may also be the result that in sub-Saharan Africa even the most 
open countries on paper do not necessarily have policies in place conducive to 
greater trade. Countries such as the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritius, Togo, 
and Zimbabwe rank amongst the most open in the Continent, but still make a 
motley crew in terms of the levels of trade and political stability. 
6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article has been to look at the determinants of FDI in sub-Saharan 
Africa, paying special attention to the role played by institutional factors and the 
quality of governance in this respect. The econometric analysis, applied to a total 
of 22 sub-Saharan African countries for the period between 1996 and 2015, 
identifies the presence of natural resources, of a degree of macroeconomic 
stability and of a good level of human capital as important assets for sub-Saharan 
African countries in their efforts to attract FDI. The size, internal wealth, and 
openness of a market, however, play an insignificant or, in some cases, negative 
role for FDI.  
The most important finding of the paper relates, however, to the key variable of 
interest; quality of governance. Despite being somewhat neglected by the 
literature on FDI in sub-Saharan Africa in the past, we have been able to prove 
that the quality of local governance plays a non-negligible role in the distribution 
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of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. Stable, more credible and effective, and less corrupt 
regimes greatly encourage and facilitate FDI, as does having a sound and effective 
legal system in which investors can place their trust. And the positive effects of 
good institutions on FDI endure over a considerable amount of time. 
African leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of local 
institutions for FDI and are adopting measures aimed at not only improving their 
countries FDI intake, but also securing a more steady and sustainable inflow of 
investment. This evolution towards better governance and a greater respect for 
citizens’ and investors’ rights is a means to arrive to a more just and sustainable 
society and also gives reason for hope that investors will eventually change their 
perception of sub-Saharan Africa and allocate a greater share of global FDI to the 
region. In that case, a snowball effect could even ensue, with more inward 
investment signalling both the conduciveness of an environment to FDI and good 
perspectives for economic and employment growth in the future. Even so, it 
should be kept in mind that such a phenomenon, which would enable the countries 
of the region to make their economies more diverse and more dynamic, will only 
materialise if Africa’s leaders and its population as a whole display a clear 
willingness to address the institutional shortcomings that have plagued the 
development of the Continent and to make sure that any institutional 
improvements remain over time. 
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Annex 1. Principal component analysis. Governance variables 
 
Annex 1a: Quality of government 
 
Eigenanalysis of the Correlation Matrix – Quality of government  
 PC1 PC2 PC3 
Eigenvalue 2.3659 0.4642 0.1698 
Proportion 0.7887 0.1547 0.0566 
Cumulative 0.7887 0.9434 1.000 
 
Coefficients of the PCA 
Variable PC1 PC2 
Government effectiveness 0.6139 -0.0902 
Regulatory quality 0.5475 0.7643 
Control of corruption 0.5687 -0.6385 
 
 
Annex 1b: Citizens’ rights and political stability 
 
Eigenanalysis of the Correlation Matrix – Citizens’ rights and political stability  
 PC1 PC2 PC3 
Eigenvalue 2.4500 0.3692 0.1807 
Proportion 0.8167 0.1231 0.0602 
Cumulative 0.8167 0.9398 1.0000 
 
Coefficients of the PCA 
Variable PC1 PC2 
Voice and accountability 0.5691 -0.6688 
Political stability 0.5616 0.7411 
Rule of law 0.6006 -0.0593 
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Annex 1c: Overall governance 
 
Eigenanalysis of the Correlation Matrix – Overall governance  
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Eigenvalue 4.4919 0.5553 0.4779 0.2242 0.1544 0.0961 
Proportion 0.7487 0.0926 0.0797 0.0374 0.0257 0.0160 
Cumulative 0.7487 0.8412 0.9209 0.9582 0.9840 1.000 
 
Coefficients des composants principaux 
Variable PC1 PC2 
Voice and accountability 0.4298 -0.1676 
Political stability 0.3622 0.8410 
Government effectiveness 0.4282 -0.4293 
Regulatory quality 0.3806 -0.1282 
Rule of law 0.4394 0.1710 
Control of corruption 0.4034 -0.1862 
 
 
